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Snoeck Henkemans has given us a welcome treatment of hyperbole that situates it 
within the field of argumentation. We have been taught, perhaps most pointedly by 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) and Fahnestock (1999), that figurative 
language has an argumentative nature. To move beyond generalizations as 
amorphous as that one, however, we need to have detailed analyses of specific 
tropes. Snoeck Henkemans is engaged in such a project, having previously studied 
rhetorical questions, praeteritio, and metonymy for us. She has now expertly added 
hyperbole to the list of tropes to be analyzed for their argumentative character. 
 For this sort of work, the central issue in our community is presently 
captured by the phrase ‘strategic maneuvering.’ This refers to the process by which 
people move rhetorically through a discourse space that might otherwise be 
described only dialectically (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999). Strategic 
maneuvering is a fairly clear and uncontroversial idea for some members of our 
community (those hailing from rhetoric and communication) but is a little delicate 
for others (the informal logicians and other philosophers). The reason for this mild 
difference in perspective is that the rhetoricians see a critical discussion as an 
exhibition of rhetorical action that might be disciplined by dialectical norms, 
whereas the philosophers see the same exchange as a dialogue whose nature is 
sometimes obscured by unnecessarily imprecise or otherwise objectionable 
phrasing. We all see the same things going on, but groups of us are trained to see 
different things first and essentially. 
 Rhetorical and dialectical action have a means-end relationship. For a very 
few people, awkwardly including many in this room, the primary motive for 
entering into a critical discussion might be to find out the truth. For most people, 
however, the controlling motive would be rhetorical: to prevail or dominate. To see 
how few people argue to seek truth, try wandering through a shopping mall, 
approaching strangers, and saying, “I’m having trouble deciding which is more 
important, truth or justice. Will you help me figure it out?” See how many takers you 
get. van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, p. 481) understood clearly which was the 
means and which the end, in their early explanation of strategic maneuvering: 
 
The balancing of a resolution-minded dialectical objective with the rhetorical 
objective of having one’s own position accepted is occasion for strategic 
manoeuvring in which the parties seek to meet their dialectical obligations without 




In this phrasing, I believe that van Eemeren and Houtlosser are acknowledging that 
people argue order to pursue their personal aims (not their epistemological ones) 
and that dialectical discipline is accepted so long as it does not endanger rhetorical 
aims. In other words, dialectical action is a means to the achievement of a rhetorical 
goal. 
 Our problem, summed up in the phrase strategic maneuvering, is that 
dialectical action is not the only possible means. Threats, violence, bribery, sexual 
blackmail, lying – these could bring home forced cooperation or some other 
personal objective. Notice that all these things can be done with words. All of them 
could appear in a face-to-face disagreement. Our community’s problem is to figure 
out when various maneuvers are tolerable and when they must be rejected as 
fallacies and derailments. 
 Finally, this brings me back to hyperbole. Snoeck Henkemans gives us a 
number of examples in which the hyperbole was expressive and not obscuring, 
charming and not unfair, emphatic and not threatening. But she also gives us other 
instances in which the hyperbole tried to move the burden of proof unfairly or made 
an emotionally forceful claim that could not be traced down to a proposition to 
which the speaker was committed. The linguistic form is neither guilty nor innocent 
by itself. Snoeck Henkemans insists therefore on the importance of context in 
interpreting hyperbole. I think that she means semantic or topical context in these 
remarks. 
 I was struck by a different clue in Snoeck Henkemans’ paper. Her first 
sentence defines hyperbole as “a rhetorical trope by means of which statements are 
made that are obviously exaggerated and thus untrue or unwarranted.” Most of her 
paper is about the idea of exaggeration. I’d like to take a moment to think about 
“obviously.” Obvious to whom? It could be the speaker, the hearer, or the external 
analyst, but I think the real answer is that ‘hyperbole’s exaggeration is obvious to 
anyone who actually understands the hyperbole.’ Some people may not understand 
hyperbole very well because they don’t work well with figurative language (e.g., 
Douglas & Peel 1979), and some may be uncertain about a particular example. I 
myself wasn’t sure whether Snoeck Henkeman’s 6th example (the one that claimed 
“hundreds of thousands of people can confirm this”) was a literal claim or not. We 
can all see that when something is intended as hyperbole but isn’t understood as 
such, trouble is brewing, and the same can be said when a statement is intended 
literally but is treated as an exaggeration. Confusions and derailments, at least 
temporary ones, are likely in these circumstances because of a failure in 
obviousness. 
 But what happens when the hyperbole is obvious, when everyone 
understands what is happening? Is derailment possible then? I am not sure it is, at 
least for people who are participating dialectically. If I say at dinner tonight, 
“Michael Gilbert is the prince of philosophy, the duke of dialectic, and the great lord 
of logic,” I doubt that any of you would be taken in by my apparent claims of his 
royal heritage. These descriptions are so obviously exaggerated that you would tone 
them down to a plausible expression of my appreciation for his work. You would 
hold me responsible for defending that judgment if necessary, and I would be 
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committed to do so – just as pragma-dialectical norms would wish. Even if there 
were some momentary confusion about how literal I was being – maybe you think 
Michael Gilbert bears some resemblance to the English royal family – we could 
quickly clarify things. But as I quietly specified, this is only the case “for people who 
are participating dialectically.” 
Sometimes people only participate rhetorically, without any dialectical 
interests. They take cheap shots, they make accusations that are so odd that they are 
difficult to disprove, they leap toward slippery slopes, and they use hyperbole to get 
on the evening news. Thus Snoeck Henkemans’ 7th example when one televised 
politician insists that “nobody” believes his opponent and “everyone” knows his 
leadership is flawed. Remember that we have seen that dialectical action is only a 
means to rhetorical aims, and is not even the only means. Sometimes people use the 
appearance of reasoned exchanges as no more than a cover, just as a little girl might 
put on her mother’s dress so she can pretend to be grown up. There is no derailment 
here because there was no dialectical engagement in the first place.  Obviousness 
doesn’t help because simply pointing out the exaggeration doesn’t get the statement 
discarded or rephrased, as ought to happen in a critical discussion. 
 I am not sure how far to press this reasoning. Is obviousness always a 
protection against derailment for people who are dialectically engaged? I am a little 
worried that obviousness might be smuggling in the idea of perfect mutual 
understanding, which isn’t very realistic. On the other hand, if a hyperbole is 
obvious it seems as though it can be set aside just as easily as a little jest between 
friends, with no damage at all to the character of their joint reasoning. In any event, I 
think we should contemplate “obviously” just as carefully as “exaggerated” in 
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